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Abstract: Nudging has been adopted by many disciplines in the last decade in order to achieve
behavioural change. Information security is no exception. A number of attempts have been made
to nudge end-users towards stronger passwords. Here we report on our deployment of an enriched
nudge displayed to participants on the system enrolment page, when a password has to be chosen. The
enriched nudge was successful in that participants chose significantly longer and stronger passwords.
One thing that struck us as we designed and tested this nudge was that we were unable to find any
nudge-specific ethical guidelines to inform our experimentation in this context. This led us to reflect on
the ethical implications of nudge testing, specifically in the password authentication context. We mined
the nudge literature and derived a number of core principles of ethical nudging. We tailored these to the
password authentication context, and then show how they can be applied by assessing the ethics of our
own nudge. We conclude with a set of preliminary guidelines derived from our study to inform other
researchers planning to deploy nudge-related techniques in this context.
Key words: nudge, ethics, autonomy
1. INTRODUCTION
The password is intended to be a secret shared exclusively
between the password owner and the system the password
controls access to. Passwords can leak for a number of
reasons. They could be guessed, for example, especially if
weak passwords are chosen, as users tend to do [1]. Leaked
passwords permit unauthorised access to sensitive personal
or organisational data in a way that is sometimes very hard
to detect.
It is standard practice for organisations to offset this risk by
expiring passwords on a regular basis [2, 3]. The rationale
is that this curtails ongoing use of leaked passwords, and
also reveals dormant accounts, thereby improving overall
system security.
End users seldom contemplate password replacement with
enthusiasm. They might well react to password expiry by
choosing weak passwords. This, then, appears to justify
password expiry, leaving organisations with no choice
but to continue enforcing regular password expiry. The
end result is deterioration of system security, with ever
weaker passwords [4, 5]. The eventual result is weaker,
not stronger, password defences.
Some have suggested a middle ground, where the expiry
requirement is directly proportional to the strength of the
password chosen by the user [6, 7, 8]. Under this scheme,
weak passwords would expire much more quickly than
strong passwords. This scheme rewards end users for
strong passwords by allowing them to use the password
for longer, thereby amortising the effort they put into
formulating and remembering it. It also satisfies the
organisation’s need for measures that protect their systems.
We trialled this scheme, using an enriched nudge to ensure
that the end users were aware of the variable expiry period,
and to ensure that they were aware of being “nudged”
towards stronger passwords. We wanted them to be aware
of the extended expiry time scheme. Our trial proved
efficacious: participants chose significantly longer and
stronger passwords.
In carrying out the research we were somewhat perturbed
by the fact that we were not able to find nudge-specific
ethical guidelines to inform our experimentation in this
context. By “ethics”, we mean “Moral principles that
govern a person’s behaviour or the conducting of an
activity” (OED). In this context, that refers to the way
researchers should conduct nudge-related research.
We followed the generic BPS guidelines [9] to obtain
ethical approval, as required by our institution, but we
were left somewhat dissatisfied that we did not have more
nuanced guidelines to apply. In this paper, we report on
the deployment of our nudge, and we then consider how
we could inform subsequent nudge trials by deriving a set
of ethical guidelines specifically for this context.
The following section discusses the password expiry issue,
presenting the raison d’eˆtre for the practice, and the
consequences thereof. Then the enriched nudge, and
the experiment carried out to assess its impact on end
users, is presented (Section 4.) and the results reported
(Section 5.). In Section 6. we report on a review we
did of the ethical nudge literature, and conclude with a
set of guidelines to inform and guide researchers in the
password authentication discpline. Section 7. makes some
recommendations about future directions for research.
Section 8. concludes.
2. PASSWORD EXPIRY
It is common for organisations to require their employees
to change passwords regularly∗, and indeed this is often
considered to be “good practice” [10, 11]. The reason for
mandating password expiry is the belief that it improves
security [12, 13].
Yet leading academics [4, 5, 14, 15], journalists [16], and
standards bodies, such as NIST [17], are urging system
administrators to rethink their traditional password expiry
practices because it effectively weakens passwords in the
long run and is not the cure-all many believe it to be.
2.1 The Burden
Passwords, in and of themselves, can impose an
unacceptable burden on computer users [18]. Password
expiry exacerbates this. Password expiration has two
immediate consequences in terms of human behaviour,
given the fact that users cannot amortise the effort involved
in memorising a strong password over a long period of
time.
The first consequence is that people are likely to drift
towards ever weaker passwords with each successive
change, perhaps incrementing a digit at the end of the
password or appending the month and year, merely to
offset the expense of memorising a new password each
month [4, 5].
The second consequence is that they are more likely to
record the password either on paper or digitally [19,20,21],
because they dread forgetting it [22, 23].
Both of these consequences weaken the mechanism [24],
the opposite of what password expiry is intended to
achieve. It also undeniably undermines the user experience
and often prevents users from accessing their accounts.
An expired password requires immediate action, perhaps
when users have other urgent goals to satisfy. If they
change the password in haste, merely to gain access to
their account when there is some urgency, they are likely
to forget the hastily-formulated password. They then have
to go through the pain of password replacement, and for
some systems this process is more arduous than for others.
This can result in a loss of productivity and also financial
cost related to help desk resources.
It is unsurprising that this leads to the use of weak
passwords. People wish to avoid the pain and
inconvenience of a replacement and act to prevent such an
occurrence.
∗https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/
simplest-security-guide-better-password-practices
http://hitachi-id.com/documents/
password-management-best-practices.php
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff741764.aspx
2.2 The Expense
Password expiration is expensive for end-users, but also
for organisations. Password forgetting is likely to lead to
an extra number of help desk calls.
If each person calls only two times more a year, for
whatever reason, consider what the cost would be. Figure
1 shows a compilation of data collected from Gartner,
Forrester, and the META Group by Osper [25] using
this tool: http://www.mandylionlabs.com/PRCCalc/
PRCCalc.htm. The table represents a possible cost
scenario if a company were to experience just two
additional help desk calls per person and year, on average.
The assumption here is that the extra calls can be related
to anything, but that 30% relate to passwords, regardless
of the number of calls. The numbers make it clear that any
number of extra help desk calls have very real financial
implications.
Figure 1: Cost scenario of just two additional password related
helpdesk calls a year, on average [25]
This expenditure and undermined user experience might
be warranted if expiry does indeed reduce the probability
and duration of unauthorised access. This is only the
case where the person who obtains the password plans to
carry out long-term forays into the account. The reality is
that most password thieves will carry out their nefarious
activities as soon as they gain access to the password
[4]. Password expiry, in these cases, is the equivalent of
shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. There
are other ways of providing superior protection, and these
are considered next.
2.3 The Threat
The specific threat that password expiry addresses is
password leakage: it limits the period during which the
leaked password can be used. Passwords can be leaked
either deliberately or inadvertently (Table 1). Password
expiry is not intended to address the former. If someone
wishes to share a password he/she will simply share
the newly-chosen password when the previous password
expires.
Category Action
(1) Deliberate Owner shares password [26]
(2) Password
Choice
Weak Password Guessed [27]
Encrypted Weak Password stolen
and easily decrypted [28]
Strong Password Observed During
Entry [29]
Record of Strong Password Discov-
ered [19]
(3) Technical
Failure
Theft during transmission or stor-
age or due to a website bug [30, 31]
(4) Deception Phishing [32]
Vishing [33]
Table 1: Password Leakage Categories
Leakage is only a major issue if the credential owner is
unaware of the leakage, as and when it happens. If he or
she becomes aware of it, he/she can act quickly to change
the password and thereby curtail access and prevent further
damage.
If the password owner does not discover the leak, the
thief can keep using the password as long as there are no
detectable side effects. So, for example, if a Phisher bot
gets hold of a password it will probably be used pretty
much immediately. The legitimate credential owner is
likely to observe the side effects of such usage, and will
act to curtail access.
Sometimes credentials can be used merely to snoop, which
might be the case if an email password has been stolen
by an ex-partner, for example. In some cases credentials
are used to leapfrog into the organisation’s systems and
infrastructures. In this case the side effects will not
necessarily be evident in the password owner’s account. If
there are no immediately-observable side effects, the thief
can keep using the leaked password unhindered.
2.4 Alternatives
Although there is no empirical evidence that password
expiry does indeed result in more secure systems [14], it
remains “good practice” in industry. It might limit the
damage that can be carried out by undiscovered password
leakage. What it definitely does is make those responsible
for security feel that they are “doing something” to
counteract insecurities caused by poor password practice.
That being so, it is unlikely that organisations will
discontinue this practice without compelling evidence that
doing so will not weaken the security of their systems.
There are other measures that could serve a similar purpose
to password expiry. Some of these alternatives perform
better than expiry without the accompanying human
cognitive cost. For example, the following techniques are
examples of what could be used:
• Notifications: Some systems display an informative
“last login” message whenever a person accesses their
account to reveal illicit activity. This does serve to
reveal password leakage if two pre-conditions are
met: (1) the person notices the display and realises
that he or she was not responsible for the access,
(2) the legitimate user accesses the system frequently.
Neither of these is, unfortunately, a given. Indeed, it
is the infrequently-used account credentials that are
most prized by hackers [34].
• Alerts: Other systems send an email to the legitimate
user whenever anyone accesses the account. If the
owner did not access the account, he or she is
alerted and can act to terminate the hacker’s access.
This works unless the person accesses the system
frequently, in which case it could become merely an
annoyance and the emails would be ignored.
• Multi-Password: Some systems require an ad-
ditional password whenever an action could have
consequences. The hacker would then need to
steal both passwords in order to carry out his/her
nefarious activities, which makes things a bit harder
but requires the user to memorize two passwords
which increases effort and the possibility of forgetting
a password.
• Multi-Factor: Some systems use two-factor authen-
tication, requiring a token or biometric in addition
to the password. This bolsters the mechanism
and renders a single leakage less damaging. Still,
tokens are costly and need to be carried around to
be available upon log-in. Using biometrics as a
second authentication mechanism is promising, but
often also requires costly devices or sensors and
has implications on privacy. Furthermore, several
circumstances (e.g. age, injuries, hand cream,
contact lenses) can prevent users from authenticating
with biometrics [35]. The most popular fall-back
mechanism then still is the password that is associated
with the same problems as the multi-password
approach.
• Multi-Channel: Some systems utilise a separate
channel to authorise side-effect actions. So, for
example, a hacker could steal a password and be
able to log into someone’s bank account to see their
details. If he or she attempts to transfer money out of
the account, a message is sent to the legitimate owner
via another channel, perhaps a registered mobile
phone, to authorise the transfer. In this way the
hacker’s purpose is revealed. This mechanism is often
used for accounts people really care about, such as
their bank accounts. While increasing the security
without having to remember further passwords, this
mechanism requires the user to have access to both
channels at the same time which isn’t always a given,
e.g. when paying with a credit card in a foreign
country without having access to a mobile network
so that they can receive SMS messages.
• One-Time Passwords: Some organisations issue
their users with a bespoke device that generates
one-time passwords. These expire immediately and
leakage is rendered a non-threat. However, the
inconvenience of carrying the device around, and the
expense thereof, probably limits its applicability.
• Expire Intelligently: Schneider [36] suggests
expiring passwords only when anomalous behaviour
is detected on a user’s account.
Table 2 summarises this discussion.
Alternative Advantage Disadvantage
Notifica-
tions
Cheap Habituation [37];
Only effective for
frequently-used
accounts
Alerts Cheap Habituation unless alerts
only signal side-effect
actions [38]; Habituation
to receiving alerts could
be exploited by Phishers
Multi-
Password
Two
Passwords
have to be
leaked;
Improved
Security
Expense: increases cog-
nitive effort and doubles
the number of password
resets
Multi-
Factor
Improved
Security [39]
Expense; Not
Scalable [40] Requires
hardware on client that
limits applicability;
Biometrics have privacy
implications
Multi-
Channel
Improved
Security [41]
Expense; Delays on
some channels (eg. SMS
texts) [42]
One-Time
Password
Device
High
Security [43]
Expense and Inconve-
nience
Expire In-
telligently
Reduces
Expiry
Burden
Still experimental (needs
to be tested empirically)
Table 2: Password Expiry Alternatives
2.5 Status Quo Rationale
Many companies may consider these alternatives too
complex or expensive, especially since they themselves
would have to carry the implementation cost. Enforcing
password expiry pushes the cost onto the end user and
seems cheaper, at first glance. The fact that users migrate
towards weaker passwords and thereby compromise the
security of their accounts might be a consequence they
feel is a reasonable trade-off. They might argue that it
is the weak password holder, him or herself, who has to
face the consequences. They are probably not considering
the possibility that access to a hacked account can be used
to leapfrog onto others, or to other organisational systems,
using zero-day exploits.
2.6 Proposed Experiment
Our proposal was to implement a strength-dependent
password expiry scheme, to determine whether this would
encourage stronger password choice. In order to ensure
that users were aware of this scheme, we deployed an
enriched nudge.
Before we introduce the scheme we first review other uses
of nudging reported in the research literature.
3. RELATED WORK
Nudging has enjoyed a great deal of media hype over the
last few years. The UK [44] and USA [45] Governments,
among others, have established units to investigate their
use in the public sector. Public health is following suit [46].
The nudging technique [47] manipulates the choice
architecture (the user interface, in this study’s context) to
induce people to take the wiser course of action. Nudging
is a behavioural economics technique. Other fields also
report techniques to change behaviours inexpensively [48,
49].
Not everyone considers nudging a worthwhile endeavour
[50], but they have been successful in a range of contexts
[51, 52, 53]. For example, small changes in the text of
letters sent to citizens made a difference to tax payment
rates [53].
What about the information security context? A
security-related nudge study [54] successfully nudged
users towards a more secure WiFi by using colour and
menu order. This finding was confirmed by [55]. Privacy
researchers have deployed nudges with some success [56,
57, 58] making people more aware of privacy invasions.
People acted upon their new awareness, a strong result.
Password authentication nudge studies have not yet been
as successful in delivering change [59, 60, 61, 6]. The
password strength meter is also a nudge providing strength
feedback, either post-entry or dynamically [62, 63, 64, 60].
Only Vance et al. [64] and Ur et al. [65] reported a
positive result with these meters. The study by Ur et
al. was an initial scoping study, using Mechanical Turk.
As a next step other researchers have tested nudges in
the wild and reported that the meters did not improve
password strength, unless users perceived the account
to be important. If people do not attribute value, then
it is understandable that the password meter makes no
difference to their choice.
Because password choice is such an important issue in the
field of information security it was considered worthwhile
to carry out a study to trial a previously-untested nudge
in order to identify something that would indeed prove
efficacious.
The study described here is part of a long-term project
into the deployment of behavioural science techniques in
password authentication contexts. The aim was to test
the impact of authentication nudges in the wild, thus in a
natural and realistic setting. Prior to the study reported
here all the nudges we trialled were unsuccessful [66].
4. ENRICHED NUDGE
The aim of the investigation was to develop an
intervention that was powerful enough to induce people
to create stronger passwords. We implemented a
strength-dependent password expiry scheme. To ensure
that end users understood the scheme, we trialled an
enriched nudge that comprised a three-pronged approach:
1. the first a user interface tweak (a nudge),
2. the second, the mainstay of economic theory: utility
(an incentive),
3. the third (a reminder) at every system login to make
users aware of the password expiration date.
4.1 The Theory
The nudge was the user interface element that communi-
cated the scheme, the incentive was the utility, and the
reminder, after each successful authentication, that ensured
they were warned that their passwords were about to
expire.
The idea of offering an incentive to encourage actions is
based on the concept of utility. The fundamental idea
behind neo-classical economics is that people maximise
“utility” when they make choices [67]. They weigh
up the benefits and costs of each choice option and
choose the option that is “best” for them personally.
Such an internal utility calculation is possible, and
rational, if the information about the choices is complete.
If the information is imperfect, on the other hand,
Kelman [68] explains that fully rational choice becomes
impossible. Hence this manipulation removes all
uncertainty: participants were told exactly what the
consequences of each choice was. It was unambiguously
displayed as they typed in their password.
The idea of a reminder is based on the fact that people
forget and are easily distracted, especially when a number
of other information sources demand their attention [69,
70]. The use of a prominent notification was used to
offset this tendency by displaying information about the
remaining lifetime of the password every time participants
logged into the system.
In effect, the idea was that participants choosing stronger
passwords would have to change their passwords less
frequently than those who chose weaker passwords (the
incentive). The nudge would make this prominent as and
when they formulated a password. The incentive would
give them a reason (concrete utility) to choose a stronger
password. The reminder ensured that they were reminded,
frequently, about an upcoming expiry date.
4.2 The Implementation
The study was conducted with the help of a self-developed
university web application that students could use to look
up timetables, coursework information and coursework
grades. The application was only accessible from within
the campus network and with a valid student ID to prevent
outsiders from attempting to use the system. Log in was
possible with an alphanumeric password. No password
policy or other password requirements were enforced.
Nudge: An image of a long dachshund (Figure 2) was
displayed above the password entry field, both for initial
creation and password replacement. The length of the dog,
and the reputation of this particular breed for strength,
would, it was hoped, communicate a subtle message to
the participants: go long and strong. Even if they were
unfamiliar with the breed they could hardly miss the
presence of the nudge. This was calculated to draw
attention to the speech bubble emerging from the dog’s
mouth, telling them that the stronger the password, the
longer they would be able to keep it.
Figure 2: The Nudge
Incentive: The participants were offered extended
expiration periods in relation to their password’s strength
similar to the suggestion made by [6,7,8]. A survey carried
out by Tam et al. [71], where participants responded
positively to this concept, informed the decision to trial it
in the wild. The utility of the password was updated and
displayed, below the password field, as they typed in their
password. (Figure 3). This communicates a direct benefit
related to stronger password choice.
Figure 3: The Incentive
Reminder: A notification made users aware, every
time they logged in, when their password would expire.
A handy button was provided to facilitate convenient
password changes (Figure 4).
Figure 4: The Reminder
Password strength was calculated using the client-based,
free and open source JavaScript zxcvbn.js [72], a
strength estimator that uses pattern matching and minimum
entropy calculation. Among other values it delivers a
strength score between 0 and 4 that was used in this study
and that indicates whether the number of guesses required
to break the password is less than 102 (score 0), 104
(score 1), 106 (score 2), 108 (score 3), or above (score
4). For example, the password “password” gets a rating
of 0, where a password like “BouncyTigger92!” is issued a
rating of 4. The script detects 10,000 common passwords,
prevalent English words and surnames, as well as common
patterns such as dates, repeats (e.g. “aaa”), sequences (e.g.
“abcd”), and QWERTY patterns. Calculating strength
on the client side ensured no transmission of unhashed
passwords to the server. Moreover, the script is used in
industry, with the popular Dropbox cloud service being a
prominent user [72].
Password length was measured by the number of
characters in the password.
4.3 Procedure
When choosing a password for the university web
application the participating students were presented the
nudge and the incentive on the registration page of the
university web application as described above. Upon every
access, the participants were notified of the expiry date by
the reminder. Data was collected between September 2016
and March 2017.
Password recovery was relatively simple: the participants
could request a one-time code that was emailed to their
registered email address. This allowed them to define a
new password and gain access to the system as painlessly
as possible.
4.4 Participants
A total of 918 students, the majority of them being
Computer Science students, registered to use the system
that logged password change events. They logged in
10,317 times during the trial period. Of the 918, 672
opted into the study and the password strength and
password length of their passwords were included in the
analysis. Unfortunately, due to the requirements of the
ethics committee we were not able to collect any further
demographics of the students to protect their anonymity.
5. RESULTS
5.1 The Outcome
This particular enriched nudge delivered a positive result:
When participants changed their passwords, either before
the actual expiration date, or upon request after the
expiration date, they chose significantly stronger and
longer passwords than the previous one. The analysis is
described in more detail below.
5.2 Password Changes
A total of 680 password changes occurred. Of these, 64%
were forced changes due to expiration, 36% voluntarily
changed their passwords. This could happen because the
reminder warned them that the password was about to
expire. It could also happen because the user decided
spontaneously to change their password. The former is
more likely. Over the previous year, when users used
the same system without password expiration, only eleven
voluntary password changes occurred over the six-month
period. This confirms Inglesant and Sasse’s finding that
very few people voluntarily engage in password changing
activities [19].
Most password changes happened in March 2017
(26.47%) when many coursework grades are published,
and in January 2017 (24.12%) after the Christmas
holidays. Fewest changes happened at the beginning of
the term and in October (2.2%) and November (11.47%)
2016.
The password length before a change ranged from 1 to 24
characters with a mean of µ = 9.44 and σ = 2.47 and a
median of x˜ = 9. After the change, password length ranged
from 1 to 30 characters with a mean of µ = 10.42 and σ
= 3.53 and a median of x˜ = 10. A visual inspection of
the data revealed deviations from a normal distribution,
thus a Wilcoxon signed rank test was conducted. The test
was conducted on a significance level of α = .05. The
increase in length was statistically significant with W(680)
= 87827.00, p < .001. The resulting effect size of r =
.20 can be interpreted as a small effect. Figure 5 shows
the distribution of the password length before and after the
change.
Figure 5: Visualisation of the password length before and after
the change (Explanation: o indicates outliers, * indicates
extreme values).
We recorded the strength of passwords calculated with
the score metric of the strength estimator zxcvbn.js
both before and after a change. As the scale of the
password strength was ordinal, non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed rank tests were used to evaluate the differences
in password strength. Overall, the strength of changed
passwords increased from a median of x˜ = 1 to a
median of x˜ = 2. Figure 6 shows the password strength
distribution before and after the change. The increase
was statistically significant with W(680) = 22340.50, p <
.001, r = .27. In more detail, the effect was significant
for both, voluntary changes before expiration (W(245) =
9751.00, p < .001, r = .27) and forced changes after
expiration (W(434) = 29759.00, p < .001, r = .27) with a
similar effect size. The tests were conducted applying the
Bonferroni-Hochberg-procedure for multiple comparisons
correction. The effect size of r=.27 can be interpreted as
a small effect that is close to the threshold of a medium
effect (r = .3).
5.3 Forgotten Passwords
It was possible to log the number of forgotten password
events for 672 of the participants. Of these, 282 forgot
their password at least once, that is 41.96%. They forgot
passwords between one and twelve times with a mean of µ
= 2.01 (σ = 1.52) and a median of x˜ = 1. Looking at the
whole group of participants, on average, 0.84 passwords
were forgotten per person. Compared to a previous
Figure 6: Visualisation of the password strength before and after
the change.
nudge study using the same system, in which 737 users
participated, the number of people forgetting passwords
increased. In the previous study, only 219 of the 737
participants forgot their passwords at least once, that is
29.72%. In that study, on average, 0.49 passwords were
forgotten per user.
5.4 Limitations
It is possible that the participants simply reused other
strong passwords they already knew [73]. They could
also have written down the password, a fairly common
response to being confronted with a complex password
that people know they are likely to forget. None of these
coping mechanisms are easily measured and so we cannot
be certain of the extent of their deployment.
The sample in this study consisted of university students
that were mainly enrolled in technical courses such as
Computer Science. Thus, the sample might be somewhat
skewed towards being young and more technically adept
than the average user.
The web application allowed us to collect realistic
password data of actual users in contrast to more or less
artificial data that could be collected with common survey
platforms. This, on the one hand, increases the external
validity of the study but, on the other hand, prevented
us from collecting further demographic information or
reasons for people’s password choices. This could be
valuable data to be collected in future studies.
6. ETHICAL DISCUSSION
This study showed that computer users can indeed be
nudged to create stronger passwords. However, the
stronger passwords also led to an increase of about
10% in the number of people who forgot passwords,
replicating the findings of other studies [74]. Having
nudged participants towards stronger passwords, and
having observed the compromised user experience that
resulted from our nudge trial, we owed it to our participants
to reconsider Sunstein’s suggestion that we contemplate
whether nudging is indeed warranted in this context [75].
6.1 Requirements from the Nudge Literature
We ground this discussion by considering the definition of
nudging as provided by Thaler and Sunstein [76]: “Nudges
are ways of influencing choice without limiting the choice
set or making alternatives appreciably more costly in terms
of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so forth”. Two
requirements emerge from this definition: (1) the existing
available choices must be retained, and (2) the possible
choices should be more or less equivalent, in terms of
“cost” to the decision maker. Although not included
in their definition, Thaler and Sunstein also explain that
nudges should be used “for good”. Indeed, Hansen and
Jespersen [77] report that Thaler signs each copy of their
book, Nudge, with the words “Nudge for good”. Hence a
third requirement is revealed: (3) the need for nudgers to
ensure that the choice they are nudging people towards is
actually beneficial as judged by the nudgees themselves.
What about how nudges actually exercise their influence?
Nudges, according to Nys and Engelen [78], exploit
predictable cognitive biases and heuristics in order to
influence people towards wiser actions. This is also
emphasised by Saghai [79], who explains that nudges
trigger people’s automatic cognitive processes. This
targeting of automatic processes is reminiscent of the dual
processing model proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
[80]. They explain that processing happens at System
1 and System 2 levels. System 1 is the automatic and
quick way of processing, and System 2 the reflective and
more time-consuming kind of thinking. Humans prefer to
operate on the System 1 level, and only engage System 2
when they have to because it is cognitively expensive.
System 1 nudges are processed automatically and they, and
their impact, might not be transparent to nudgees. Such
nudge transparency is certainly something that concerns
many researchers [78, 81, 82].
An example of a System 1 nudge is to use smaller plates in
canteens to reduce calorie intake [83]. People do not notice
the change, and respond by eating less, but are probably
unaware of their response to the smaller plate.
Nys and Engelen [78] also argue for transparency of
nudges as a pre-requisite for their ethical deployment.
They believe that people should be aware of the presence
of the nudge. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein [76] explain
that adherence to Rawls’ Publicity principle [84], i.e. full
disclosure of the presence of the nudge and willingness to
defend its “goodness”, make it ethically sound [85].
It could reasonably be considered devious to nudge people
in a way that they are not fully aware of. On the other
hand, if we restrict ourselves to System 2 nudges, we lose
a large arsenal of tools that can be used to improve user
behaviours. It might be better to require experimenters
to justify their intention to deploy System 1 nudges rather
than forbidding them altogether.
Hence the fourth requirement is: (4) nudges should be
transparent to nudgees, unless the experimenter or nudger
is able to make a compelling argument for its opacity.
Finally, Thaler and Sunstein [76] also argue that nudge
designers should be able to specify which particular
behavioural bias their nudge is mitigating against. This
requires people to have thought about the design of the
nudge before-hand, so that its impact will be predictable.
This is our fifth requirement.
Based on the nudge literature, to qualify as an ethical
nudge, a mechanism needs to meet the following
requirements:
N1. The original set of options should be retained: none
should be removed [76, 78].
N2. The choices offered to nudgees should be more or less
equivalent in terms of cost (effort, time etc.) [77, 76].
N3. It should nudge “for good”, as judged by the nudgee
[76, 86].
N4. The nudge mechanism should be transparent [85,78],
unless the experimenter or nudger is able to make a
compelling argument for its opacity.
The rationale for this is that nudgers thereby respect
the autonomy of the decision maker. Autonomy
means that people retain the ability to construct their
own goals and values, and are free to decide, plan and
act in order to satisfy their goals and in accordance
with their values [87]. If nudges are not seen and
perceived by the nudgee, they can not reflect on their
actions and decide to act in accordance with their own
goals and values.
On the other hand, humans sometimes act emotion-
ally on the spur of the moment [88, 89, 90]. A
well-designed System 1 nudge could ameliorate this
tendency, thus helping the person to act as they would
if they were not in a ‘hot state’ [91].
N5. The nudge designer must be able to explain which
particular behavioural bias the nudge mitigates
against; to be willing to justify their choice
architecture manipulation, and predict its effects.
6.2 Judging the Enriched Nudge
Does our enriched nudge satisfy these requirements? The
first requirement is satisfied because participants were
technically free to choose weak passwords if they wanted
to. Our enriched nudge was unmistakable and obvious to
participants. It did not attempt to influence people without
their knowledge. It thus also satisfies the fourth condition,
of transparency.
The fifth requirement justification was that we were
attempting to offset the least effort principle [92] (taking
the easiest course of action without thinking about the
long-term consequences). We did this by making the
consequences of a weak password salient, and ensuring
that they were frequently reminded of the consequence or
benefit of their choices every time they logged in.
The second and third requirements warrant closer scrutiny.
(Requirement 2) Option Equivalence
First let us consider the second requirement, that available
options be equivalent in terms of cost. As a proviso,
we need to acknowledge that password strength is a
continuum, ranging from extremely weak, such as ‘123’
to very strong, such as ‘If what’s done is done, t’were well
it were done Quickly!!!’.
To simplify this discussion we shall refer to ‘weakest’
passwords as passwords on the left end of the continuum
and ‘stronger’ passwords denoting the better passwords,
those whose strength tends towards the right of the weakest
passwords on the continuum. We acknowledge the fact
that this is an over-simplification of the issue but feel that it
allows us to present a helpful delineation of password costs
for the purposes of considering the cost of a password.
It seems as if the option we were nudging people towards
was the more expensive one: stronger passwords. To
tease apart this initial assumption, let us consider three
main password costs: (1) time and effort to memorise [93],
(2) time and effort to enter the password [94] and (3)
replacement cost [19].
At first glance, memorising a weak password appears
to be less costly than memorising a strong password
i.e. mweakest < mstronger where m = memory effort.
The situation is not that straightforward, unfortunately.
Certainly the weakest password “password” is far easier
to remember than the stronger “h6@g2D”. On the other
hand, long (and therefore stronger) passwords such as
passphrases are more memorable than short complex
passwords [95]. A meaningful passphrase, such as “Blue
water ocean?”, is far more memorable than a complex
nonsense password such as “h6@g2D”. There is thus
no linear correlation between the strength of a stronger
password and the cost of memorisation.
Next, consider the entry cost. Stronger passwords, both
long and complex, take longer to enter than the weakest
ones. The long because there are more keys to type and
the complex because they require the use of different parts
of the keyboard [29]. Hence estronger > eweaker where
e = password entry effort. On the other hand, it is
likely that typing speeds improve the more often a person
enters a particular password. If someone chooses to reuse
a well-known stronger password from another system,
the entry cost would not necessarily be significantly
higher despite being stronger than the weakest password.
Moreover, entry is only costly if the password is entered
manually. If a browser add-on password manager is used,
or the browser remembers the password, this cost is either
non-existent or trivial. Once again, there is no linear
correlation between weak and stronger passwords in this
respect.
On a superficial level, if we discount the complexity of
quantifying m and e correctly, we offered participants to
a choice between Option 1 [weak password cost=
n
∑
i=1
c]
and Option 2 [stronger password cost = 0|c] where c
= replacement effort. c is composed of {p,n}, p=cost
of engaging with system’s process to recover forgotten
password and n=cognitive cost of coming up with a new
password. If the person deliberately changes the password,
then p=0, but if they are locked out, they have engage with
a password reset process, making p> 0.
Yet m, e and c are not orthogonal. Consider the following
options that could be chosen by someone being asked to
come up with a password in a real-life setting. Figure 7
presents the different options.
Option A: Reuse a stronger password from another
system. The person chooses the reduced replacement
effort, but benefits from the password requiring
no effort to memorise (m = 0) and reduced entry
effort because they have practised entering it:
ereused stronger < enew stronger.
Option B: Choose a weak password. In this case m and e
are minimised, but not 0. This is preferred to the costs
related to a stronger password, and this preference is
not affected by the consequent replacement cost of
n
∑
i=1
c.
Option C: Choose a stronger password and memorise
it. This is the opposite of option B. Here the
person chooses to minimise the replacement cost
while accepting that m and e are more costly than they
would be for a weaker password.
Option D: Choose a stronger password and record it,
perhaps by making a written record. Here m = 0 and
estronger > eweaker but replacement cost is minimised.
Option E: Choose a stronger password and allow the
browser to store it. Here m = 0 and e = 0, which
explains why this option is so popular.
Option F: Use a browser-installed password manager to
generate a stronger password, store it and populate
the password entry field when required. The cost to
the user is the same as Option E, but far more secure.
Option G: Use a password manager on a Smartphone to
manage stronger passwords. This removes the need to
memorise or record it, but the password still has to be
entered manually. Here m = 0 and estronger > eweaker
and replacement cost is minimised.
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Figure 7: Password Choice Options & Costs
In our experiment, participants were not permitted to
install browser add-ons nor to let the browser remember
their passwords on lab machines. This means options E
and F were not available. Students are permitted to connect
their own laptops to eduroam in the lab, but the student
system is only accessible from the University network,
not eduroam, so that they could not use their own laptop
browser to access the system. Hence the password choice
options open to our participants were A, B, C, D and G.
It should also be mentioned, at this stage, that c (the
replacement cost) was minimised. Participants simply
requested a one-time code be sent to their email address,
and then used that code to effect a password reset. It would
be interesting to run another longitudinal experiment
to ascertain whether a more arduous process would
encourage even greater adoption of stronger passwords that
are more durable.
An empirical investigation into the exact nature of the
trade-offs people make between these costs should be the
subject of a future study. Without such an investigation, we
cannot argue that we either satisfied or violated the second
ethical requirement.
(Requirement 3) Nudge for Good
The third requirement, to nudge “for good”, is equally hard
to judge. On the one hand, it is undeniable that weak
passwords compromise system security. A serious hacking
attack seldom affects only one computer user. Hackers
will generally use one compromised account as a stepping
stone to other accounts or other software systems on the
same infrastructure. Because one person’s poor password
choice thus potentially has an impact on others we might
well feel justified in nudging individuals towards stronger
passwords.
On the other hand, the fact that we deployed nudges
implicitly suggests that we thought the participants were
either unaware of the need for strong passwords or not
willing or able to transfer their intention of creating strong
passwords into behaviour. The potential reasons for that
are numerous and might even be reasonable from the
user’s point of view given his/her decision context and
knowledge.
For example, users might underestimate the risk of an
attack, shy away from the cost of stronger passwords,
perceive the data as not having enough value to warrant
a stronger password, or have a perception of a strong
password that does not match actual password security.
Still, whatever the reason for choosing weaker passwords,
the underlying assumption is that computer users are
unable to choose a password to match the actual
risk associated with the value of the asset and the
vulnerabilities represented by a particular password.
Deploying nudges might therefore be considered to
demonstrate a lack of respect for the participants; a
paternalistic intervention that does not respect human
autonomy [96].
Hall and Carter [97] admit that nudges infringe autonomy
but argue that it is justified to offset the nudges used
by others because nudges are intended “for good” [77].
Moreover, Gordijn and Ten Have [98] claim that autonomy
has not proved the “cure-all” for all ethical issues in
society. Brooks [99] also acknowledges the autonomy
issue but argues that nudges are inescapable as no choice
architecture can be completely neutral. Thus, from his
point of view the question is not whether to nudge, but how
to do it in an ethical way. He argues for better mechanisms
for obtaining informed consent and for nudge transparency.
Finally, Norman [100] argues that it is not autonomy, per
se, that is important, but rather that people can indeed
retain some measure of control, and that they understand
and have knowledge of what they are able to control.
With respect to our experiment, we did indeed obtain
informed consent and participants could opt out of the
study by checking a box during enrolment and all our
interventions were fully visible. Our participants thus
retained full control.
Still, this third requirement creates the most difficulty and
brings us back to the initial question: “were we justified in
deploying the nudge at all?” Would our participants have
considered the choice we nudged them towards as being
for their own benefit? If not, should we not allow end users
to decide on how strong to make their password, without
interference? Were we nudging “for good”, which Thaler
and Sunstein consider core to the ethical nudge [101]?
The real difficulty we have with nudging in this domain
is that nudges are required to align with the end user’s
judgement of personal benefit, or Thaler’s “goodness”.
The push to stronger passwords is generally good for the
organisation, for the current software system, for the other
users. Is it good for the individual, and should we be
concerned about that? Conly [102] argues that when our
actions can have a negative impact on others we can have
no expectation of autonomy. As detailed previously, poor
password choice can indeed have an impact on others.
This is a complex issue, with researchers arguing both
for and against the humans having the right to individual
autonomy [94, 103] and whether nudging violates this or
not [96, 76, 102].
We therefore reserve judgement with respect to whether
our enriched nudge justifiably infringed end-user auton-
omy, or not.
6.3 Authentication Requirements
Whereas nudging in other contexts has focused on
simplifying and easing behaviours [53], that is not always
an option in authentication, especially when it comes to
password authentication.
Authentication is a context that operates under different
constraints from other contexts. For example, in many
contexts the aim is to simplify the process the human
needs to engage with [104]. Some of the most common
techniques in achieving this is to maximise feedback on
actions [105], and to ensure that people can recover from
errors [106, 107].
Now consider the authentication context. The system is
interacting with someone who is required to prove his or
her identity. An error could be a signal of an intrusion
attempt, and the system cannot help the person to recover
from his or her error. Feedback is minimal in this context,
too, for the same lack of trust in the person interacting with
the system.
How about nudging in authentication? The option we
are nudging people towards, in the context of stronger
passwords, must be warranted. We are trying to influence
users towards expending more effort, and to do so every
time they use the system. Hence:
A1. The nudge designer must be able to argue that nudges
that encourage such efforts are indeed justified.
A2. Nudge proposers should have to make an argument
for deploying nudging at all, purely based on the value
of the resource being protected by the password, to
the nudgee him or herself. User effort, with respect
to passwords, is not free as many developers seem to
believe.
A3. Those deploying nudges have to monitor the impact
of the nudge by checking for the number of users
being locked out, the impact of the nudge on
password strength and the satisfaction of the users.
If there are unanticipated and negative side effects the
nudge can be disengaged.
We also need to remove one of the previously-listed
principles. It is not possible for the user’s options to be
equivalent with a password authentication nudge. The pure
nudge requirement for retention is not feasible and N2 will
therefore be dropped.
6.4 Ethical Password Authentication Guidelines
The information security field does indeed consider
efforts to persuade people to choose stronger passwords
worthwhile. We do not suggest that researchers have
deployed any unethical nudges in the information security
context, but there is undoubtedly scope for unethical use of
nudges in this context. This is especially true if nudgers do
not have applicable guidelines to inform their deployment.
If we concede that nudges, as a technique, are indeed
acceptable in password authentication, we should ensure
that such nudges, in an organisational and real-time setting,
exhibit a number of characteristics.
We believe it would be helpful to encode the principles
we have derived from the literature as a list, to inform and
assist researchers working in this area.
The first over-arching directive is that organ-
isations should prioritise the use of technical
measures to scaffold and bolster the security of
the system as much as possible before focusing
their efforts on changing end-user behaviour.
Having exhausted technical measures and having judged
that end users need to use stronger passwords, it should be
ensured that password nudges are:
N1: retentive: End users must still be able to vary
password strength to resist the influence of the
nudge. It might be necessary to mandate a particular
minimum password strength, and then conceivably
use the nudge to encourage passwords that exceed the
minimum. However, the weaker options should still
be available so that the nudge respects their autonomy
and agency.
N3: respectful : Choice architecture manipulations
should respect user autonomy. Users should never
feel that they have no agency when interacting with
an authentication system. Otherwise the system risks
triggering a reactance response. If the nudger can
make a coherent argument for deploying an opaque
System 1 nudge, and is able to satisfy the ethics
review board that this is essential, then it is crucial
for nudgees to be apprised of the manipulation once
the experiment is over.
They should be told that: (1) they were nudged, (2)
why this was done, (3) what the nudge was intended
to achieve, and (4) what the impact of the nudge was
over all participants.
N4: transparent : Nudgees ought to be fully aware
of the nudge and the influence it is attempting to
exert. If this would negate the influence of the
nudge, it is necessary for the nudge designer to argue
convincingly that this is the case, and for the Ethics
Review Board to be persuaded of the need for opacity.
For example, if the experimenter is concerned about
the impact of demand characteristics [108], that could
be a reason to make the nudge opaque.
The display of a password strength meter meets the
transparency requirement, as does the enriched nudge
we tested. One could imagine someone using a scary
background on the web page subliminally to induce
a fear of hacking and thereby attempting to nudge
people towards stronger passwords. Such a nudge
would not be transparent and therefore questionable
as far as ethics is concerned.
N5: defensible : It must be trivial for nudgees to contact
those deploying the nudge should they have any
questions or concerns about it. This is in line with
Rawl’s Publicity principle [84] and requires nudgers
to be able to justify the behavioural biases they are
attempting to ameliorate with the nudge.
A1: justified : Strong passwords have a cost associated
with them and user cost is not free. Nudgers should
be aware of the fact that users may rationally respond
to demands for greater strength by deploying less
secure practices, such as allowing their browser to
remember the password. This weakens the security
of the system, while putting a greater burden on the
end users. Nudgers should, if possible, ensure that the
nudgees are apprised of the motivations for the nudge
so that they understand why they are being asked to
put extra effort into authenticating.
A2: sufficient : Nudging should only be deployed when
the asset being protected requires stronger passwords
than the status quo average password, based on the
previous usage of a system. Designers should put
some thought into applying a rule such as “require
passwords to be as strong as needed, as matched to
the value of the asset, but no stronger”.
A3: monitored : A number of monitoring set points
should be defined and adhered to after roll-out to
carry out close examination so as to detect unexpected
and undesirable side effects. Amelioration or
abandonment should be considered seriously if the
user experience is being compromised unacceptably.
So, for example, the number of forgotten passwords
should be monitored and compared to the usual
number, to determine whether the user experience
is being impoverished. Other data should also
be scrutinised, such as the number of logins, the
password strength profile and any complaints from
the users.
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6.5 Summary
We started off this section by contemplating whether
nudging is indeed warranted in this context, as advised by
Sunstein [75]. Our investigation required us to consider the
ethics of nudging. As we perused the literature five distinct
requirements of ethical nudges emerged. We extended this
with three authentication-specific ethical nudge principles,
dropping one of the previous five principles. In total
we arrived at seven ethical principles for nudging in
information security.
We assessed the ethics of our enriched nudge using these as
metrics and uncovered difficulties related to two areas. The
first is the requirement for nudge options to be equivalent,
and the second that the nudge be intended for the “good”
of the nudgee.
Ajudging the latter seems to come down to the fact that
it is considered necessary by the information security
community to justify the deployment of these kinds of
techniques when individuals’ unwise actions can have
serious and undesirable side effects on others. Weak
password choice can lead to compromises that impact large
numbers of people. Is it acceptable to violate autonomy for
the greater good? Conly [102] would say yes, White [96]
would disagree.
We conclude the paper with a list of ethical password
nudge requirements, intended for those who decide that
password nudging is indeed ethical and warranted. We do
not yet make a strong argument for, or against, nudging
in this context, in particular because of the fact that they
could be considered to infringe autonomy.
7. FUTURE WORK
There is scope for further work in a number of directions.
Autonomy
We plan to carry out a more extensive investigation into
the meaning of autonomy in this context and the meaning
of potential violation that nudges can commit in the
information security context.
Change Costs
The change costs, in our experiment, were as low as we
could reasonably make them. It would be interesting to run
the experiment again with a more expensive replacement
process in order to see what impact that would have on
password strength.
Password Costs
An investigation into the interplay between the different
aspects making up actual password cost would be very
insightful and is something worth pursuing.
Generalising the Ethical Guidelines
It would obviously be helpful if we were able to produce
a more general set of guidelines to inform other research
areas within Information Security and Privacy, and we plan
to pursue this goal next.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we report on an investigation into the efficacy
of an enriched nudge, comprising a nudge, an incentive
and a reminder, in terms of influencing people towards
choosing stronger passwords.
The focus of this paper was on learning lessons from our
experiences, and from the nudge literature, in order to
derive nudge-specific ethical guidelines. Our purpose was
to provide guidance to other researchers experimenting
with nudges in authentication, and to ethics review boards
having to assess and approve research proposals.
We thus conclude this paper with a set of ethical
guidelines for nudging in password authentication and we
demonstrate how these can be applied.
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